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CARLSON v. STATE:
FAIR FEES FOR FISHING FAR FROM HOME
Oliver F. C. Murray*
"[All men are equal before fish."'
I. INTRODUCTION
Every year the abundance of marine life attracts nonresident commer-
cial fishermen to the icy waters off the coast of Alaska.2 The State of
Alaska charges these nonresident commercial fishermen three times as
much as resident commercial fishermen for fishing licenses3 and limited
entry permits.4 In Carlson v. State,5 a class representing all nonresident
commercial fishermen challenged the constitutionality of these fee
differentials.6 Specifically, the class alleged the violation of rights afforded
by the Commerce Clause7 and the Privileges and Immunities Clause8 of the
United States Constitution.' A majority of the Supreme Court of Alaska
held that the case did not implicate the Commerce Clause." The court did,
however, entertain the class's challenge under the Privileges and Immuni-
* University of Maine School of Law, Class of 1999.
1. THEGREATQUOTATIONS331 (George Seldes ed., 1960) (quoting Herbert C. Hoover).
2. See, e.g., Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission, 1997Permit Status ReportforAll
Fisheries (visited Jan. 27,1998) <http:llwww.cfec.state.ak.us/PSTATUS/14051997.HTM>.
3. See infra note 36.
4. See infra note 37.
5. 919 P.2d 1337 (Alaska 1996).
6. Id.
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Commerce Clause provides that "[t]he Congress
shall have Power... [t]o regulate Commerce... among the several States."
8. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. The Privileges and Immunities Clause provides that
"[t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in
the several States."
9. Carlson v. State, 919 P.2d at 1338.
10. d at 1340-41.
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ties Clause. The court endorsed a formula that given more finalized
budgetary figures would test the constitutionality of Alaska's nonresident
commercial fishery fee differentials under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause.2 The court remanded the case to the superior court to ascertain
those figures and to apply the formula. 3
This Note analyzes the treatment of nonresident commercial fishery fee
differentials under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. Part II traces the development of case law in this field. Part
III assesses the Supreme Court of Alaska's adoption and endorsement of a
mathematical formula to determine the constitutionality of Alaska's
nonresident commercial fishery fee differentials. Part IV considers whether
this formula could be a model against which the constitutionality of other
nonresident commercial fishery fee differentials could be judged. This
Note concludes that a system of taxation unique to Alaska will likely
confine the application of the formula to that state.
II. LEGAL HISTORY OF COMMERCIAL FISHING FEE DIFFERENTIALS
UNDER THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE
Since 1948, the scope of nonresident commercial fishery fee differen-
tials has been defined under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
U.S. Constitution. 14 Prior to 1948, courts routinely held that the Constitu-
tion did not guarantee equal treatment to residents and nonresidents in the
taking of fish. 5 States established nonresident license fees that effectively
priced nonresidents out of their fisheries. 6 In Texas, for example, while
residents were charged $3 to license their vessels, nonresidents were
charged $2500; a differential of 83,333.33%."7 It was to this kind of
injustice that the U.S. Supreme Court responded in 1948.
11. Id. at 1341-44.
12. Id. at 1342-44.
13. Id. at 1344.
14. See infra notes 18-34 and accompanying text.
15. See Toomer v. Witsell, 73 F. Supp. 371, 376 (E.D.S.C. 1947) The court stated: "It
is well settled ... that these constitutional provisions do not require the state to accord
equality of treatment to non residents and residents with respect to the taking of fish ....
Id.
16. See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
17. See Brownsville Shrimp Co. v. Miller, 207 S.W.2d 911, 912 (Tex. 1947).
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A. Toomer v. Witsell
Modem Privileges and Immunities jurisprudence is widely regarded as
stemming from the U.S. Supreme Court's 1948 Tobmer decision.' In
Toomer, the Supreme Court invalidated a South Carolina statute that
required nonresidents to pay one hundred times more than South Carolina
residents for a license to fish commercially for shrimp in the three-mile
maritime belt off the coast of that state. 9 In reaching this conclusion, the
Court rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the statute 0 and developed
a new two-step test to assess the constitutionality of discrimination against
nonresidents under the Privileges and Immunities Clause.2'
The Toomer two-step test recognized that "[Il]ike many other constitu-
tional provisions, the Privileges and Immunities Clause is not an absolute"'22
but nevertheless strictly limited discrimination against nonresidents to
"where (i) there is a substantial reason for the difference in treatment; and
(ii) the discrimination practiced against nonresidents bears a substantial
relationship to the State's objective."'
The Court applied the two-step test to the facts of Toomer and
concluded that although a State could legitimately:
charge non-residents a differential which would merely compen-
sate.., for any added enforcement burden.., or for any conserva-
tion expenditures from taxes which only residents pay[,] [w]e
would be closing our eyes to reality, we believe, if we concluded
that there was a reasonable relationship between the danger
18. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948); see generally Werner Z. Hirsch, The
Constitutionality ofState Preference (Residency) Laws Underthe Privileges and Immunities
Clause, 22 SW. U.L. REV. 1, 12 n.47 (1992) (stating that the Toomer decision marks the
beginning of the Supreme Court's modem privileges and immunities analysis); John A.
Coppede, Note, Constitutional Law--Wyoming Upholds a Resident Laborer Preference
Statute. State v. Antonich, 694 P.2d60(Wyo. 1985), 21 LAND &WATERL. REV. 219,220
(1986).
19. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. at 403.
20. Id at 394-95. The Supreme Court reasoned that "the taking of shrimp occurs before
the shrimp can be said to have entered the flow of interstate commerce." Id.
21. Id. at 396.
22. Id.
23. New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274,284 (1984) (citing Toomer v. Witsell, 334
U.S. at 396). The utility of using the Piper test is that it puts the language of Toomer into
one sentence.
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represented by non-citizens, as a class, and the severe discrimina-
tion practiced upon them.24
B. Mullaney v. Anderson
The United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the Toomer two-step test
in its Mullaney decision." In Mullaney, the Supreme Court invalidated an
Alaska statute that required nonresidents to pay ten times more than Alaska
residents for a license to fish in what then were Alaska's territorial waters.26
The Territorial government of Alaska asserted that under the Toomer two-
step test the added costs of enforcing the licensing requirements against
nonresident commercial fishermen bore a substantial relationship to the
level of discrimination imposed. The Court, however, concluded that the
challenged discrimination faltered at the second step of the test, and stated
that "something more is required than [a] bald assertion to establish a
reasonable relation [ship] between the higher fees and the higher cost to the
Territory."28
C. Tangier Sound Waterman's Association v. Pruitt
In 1993, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals gave its own interpreta-
tion of the Toomer two-step test in its Tangier Sound 9 decision. In Tangier
Sound, the Fourth Circuit invalidated a Virginia statute that charged
out-of-state commercial fishermen an extra $1150 for a "special nonresi-
dent harvester's license., 31 Virginia defended the $1150 differential,
stating that it represented a nonresident's share of the state's resource
management costs. 3' The State reached the $1150 sum by dividing the
budget of Virginia's marine management program (the numerator) by the
number of resident commercial fishermen (the denominator).32 The Fourth
24. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. at 399.
25. Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415 (1952).
26. Id.
27. Id. at417-18.
28. Id. at 418.
29. Tangier Sound Waterman's Ass'n v. Pruitt, 4 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 1993).
30. Id. at 268.
31. Id. at 267.
32. Id. at 265.
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Circuit, however, held that the fee differential tripped on the second step
of the Toomer test.33 The court reasoned that in calculating the fee
differential of $1150, the facts and figures represented in both the
numerator and denominator of the State's formula were inappropriately
determined.'
III. CARLSON V. STATE
A. Facts and Procedure
In 1984, a class representing all nonresident commercial fishermen
challenged Alaska's practice of charging them three times as much as
resident commercial fishermen" for commercial fishing licenses36 and
limited entry permits." Among other allegations,3" the class claimed that
33. Id. at 267.
34. The Fourth Circuit explained that Virginia had overstated the numerator by failing
to recognize the sums that nonresidents contributed in the form of various fees and sales
taxes. The court further noted that Virginia should have used the number of Virginia
taxpayers as the denominator. Tangier Sound Waterman's Ass'n v. Pruitt, 4 F.3d at 267-68.
Indeed, it seems that the Fourth Circuit was advocating a formula similar to the one adopted
by the class in Carlson I. See infra note 53.
35. Brief of Appellants at 2, Carlson v. State, 919 P.2d 1337 (Alaska 1996) (No.
S-6590).
36. ALAsKASTAT. § 16.05.480 (a) (Michie 1996).
A person engaged in commercial fishing shall obtain a commercial fishing license.
The fee for the license is $30 for residents, and $90 for nonresidents. Except for those
which are also entry or interim-use permits, all commercial fishing licenses are
nontransferable. The commercial fishing license shall be retained in the possession
of the licensee, readily accessible for inspection at all times. No more than one fee
may be charged annually against a person. For the purposes of this section,
"commercial fishing license" includes entry permits and interim-use permits issued
under AS 16.43 and crewmember fishing licenses.
Id.
37. ALASKA STAT. § 16.43.160(a)-(b) (Michie 1996).
(a) The commission [Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission] shall establish annual
fees for the issuance and annual renewal of entry permits or interim-use permits. The
amount paid by a permit holder under the provisions of AS 16.05.480 shall be credited
by the commission toward payment of the fee charged under this section. No more that
one credit may be obtained annually by a person.
(b) Annual fees established under this section shall be no less than $10 and no more
than $750 and shall reasonably reflect the different rates of economic return for
different fisheries. The amount of an annual fee for a nonresident shall be three times
the amount of the annual fee for a resident.
1999]
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the fee differentials violated two clauses of the U.S. Constitution: the
Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Commerce Clause.39 The
superior court granted a motion for summary judgment by the State,n" and
the class appealed to the Supreme Court of Alaska (Carlson I).41
The Carlson I court somewhat passed over the Commerce Clause
claim42 and concentrated on the Privileges and Immunities action.43 The
court first ruled that commercial fishing was a sufficiently important
activity to come within the purview of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause." The court then determined that the fee differentials passed the
first step of the Toomer test by holding that equalizing the burden of
fisheries management was a substantial state interest.45  The court,
however, concluded that the record was insufficient to pass judgment on
the second step of the Toomer test.46 The court thus partially reversed the
grant of summary judgment to the State and remanded the case back to the
superior court. 47 The issue remanded was framed as follows:
The appropriate inquiry is ... whether all fees and taxes which
must be paid to the state by a nonre
Id.
38. The class initially challenged the authority of Alaska to charge the fee differential
between 1978 and 1982. This challenge was defeated at the first appeal. Brief of Appellants
at 3, Carlson v. State, 919 P.2d 1337 (Alaska 1996) (No. S-6590) (citing Carlson v. State,
798 P.2d 1269, 1278-79 (Alaska 1990)).
39. Brief of Appellants at 2-3, Carlson v. State, 919 P.2d 1337 (Alaska 1996) (No.
S-6590).
40. Brief of Appellee at5, Carlson v. State, 919 P.2d 1337 (Alaska 1996) (No. S-6590).
41. Id.
42. Carlson v. State, 798 P.2d at 1276-77. The Supreme Court of Alaska exhibited a
reluctance to conclude whether the Commerce Clause was even implicated in the appeal.
The Court weighed those cases that would involve the clause against those that would reject
it. Ultimately, however, the Court failed to take a side on this issue. Id.
43. Id. at 1274-1278.
44. Id. at 1274. The Supreme Court of Alaska noted that for an activity to be protected
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause it must be "sufficiently basic to the livelihood
of the Nation ... as to fall within the purview of the [clause]." Id. (citation omitted). Courts
must make this threshold determination before they reach the Toomer two step test.
45. Id. at 1278.
46. Id.
47. Carlson v. State, 798 P.2d at 1278.
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state revenues to which nonresidents make no contribution are
taken into account.48
The court placed the burden of proof on the State.49
The decisive issue on remand became the size of fee differential that
would be allowable5 In cross-motions for summary judgment, each side
advanced a competing formula to calculate this sum."1 The class advanced
aper capita formula, and the State advanced apro rata formula. 2 Briefly
stated, the class's per capita formula established a maximum allowable fee
differential in a two-step formula by dividing the state's fisheries budget by
the population of the state and then multiplying that figure by the percent-
age of total state revenues to which nonresidents made no contribution. 3
By contrast, the State's pro rata formula compared the percentages that
residents and nonresidents paid of their pro rata share' of the state's
fisheries budget.5" Under this formula, the fee differential would be
allowable so long as the percentage that residents paid of their pro rata
share of the state's fisheries budget was equal to or greater than the
corresponding percentage paid by nonresidents.5 6
48. Id.
49. 1& at 1276. The significance of this action should not go unnoted. This was the
first time that any court in a fee differentials case had unequivocally assigned the burden of
persuasion with one or other oftheparties. SeeTaylorv. Conta, 316 N.W.2d 814,823 (Wis.
1982) (discussing the ambiguity of which party should bear the burden of proof in Privileges
and Immunities cases). In Taylor the Supreme Court of Wisconsin suggested a reason for
placing the burden with the state. The court explained that "[s]ince nonresidents are not
represented in the... State's legislative halls, judicial acquiescence... would remit them
to such redress as they could secure through their own State .... " Id. at 818. (citation
omitted).
50. Brief of Appellants at 4, Carlson v. State, 919 P.2d 1337 (Alaska 1996) (No.
S-6590).
51. Carlson v. State, 919 P.2d 1337, 1339 (Alaska 1996).
52. Id.
53. Brief of Appellants at 5-6, Carlson v. State, 919 P.2d 1337 (Alaska 1996) (No.
S-6590). The class's per capita formula can be summarized in a simple equation:
• . . b'isheries Budget ..MaxirmumFee Diffrntial = A~ta sopulatio % Total State Revenue to Which Nonresidents Make No Contribution
Id. at 6.
54. The pro rata share is determined by multiplying the percentage of permits held by
residents or nonresidents by Alaska's fisheries budget. Carlson v. State, 919 P.2d at 1345.
55. Brief of Appellee at 14, Carlson v. State, 919 P.2d 1337 (Alaska 1996) (No.
S-6590).
56. Id. at 14-15.
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The superior court initially adopted the class's per capita approach. 7
The State then successfully moved to reconsider, arguing that summary
judgment was improperly granted because there were genuine issues of
material fact over the figures that should be included in calculating the
state's fisheries budget.58 After reconsideration, the court adopted the
State's approach, and, without ruling on the budgetary issue, it granted the
State summary judgment.59 The class again appealed to the Supreme Court
of Alaska (Carlson II).6°
B. Arguments on Appeal
On appeal, the class raised three arguments. First, the class argued that
the crossing of interstate borders to enter Alaskan waters cloaked nonresi-
dent commercial fishermen with the protection of the Commerce Clause of
the United States Constitution.61 The class reasoned that under the United
States Supreme Court's recent decision in Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v.
Department of Environmental Quality of the State of Oregon,62 the
discrimination 63 inherent in Alaska's nonresident commercial fishery fee
differentials rendered them "virtually per se invalid" under the Clause.
64
Second, the class argued that Alaska's nonresident fee differentials
violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the U.S. Constitution.6'
This argument began with an absolute assertion that no fee differential was
allowable under the Clause.' The class explained this stance by contend-
57. Id. at 7.
58. Brief of Appellants at 8, Carlson v. State, 919 P.2d 1337 (Alaska 1996) (No.
S-6590). The State argued that an extra fifteen categories should have been included in the
figures comprising Alaska's fisheries budget. Id.
59. Brief of Appellee at 7, Carlson v. State, 919 P.2d 1337 (Alaska 1996) (No. S-6590).
60. Brief of Appellants at 13, Carlson v. State, 919 P.2d 1337 (Alaska 1996) (No.
S-6590).
61. Id. at 13-24.
62. 511 U.S. 93 (1994).
63. The class argued that in this case "discrimination" meant nothing more than the
"differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former
and burdens the latter." Brief of Appellants at 15, Carlson v. State, 919 P.2d 1337 (Alaska
1996) (No. S-6590) (citing Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental
Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. at 99).
64. Brief of Appellants at 15-17, Carlson v. State, 919 P.2d 1337 (Alaska 1997) (No.
S-6590).
65. Id. at 24-38.
66. Id. at 25.
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ing that under the Fourth Circuit's Tangier Sound decision it was unlikely
that Alaska's fee differentials could pass the second step of the Toomer
test.' The class then argued that any residual chance of the fee differen-
tials passing the Toomer two-step test was absolutely foreclosed by the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Oregon Waste Systems.6" The class recog-
nized that Oregon Waste Systems had been decided under the Commerce
Clause and responded by presenting evidence of the "mutually reinforcing
relationship" between the Commerce Clause and the Privileges and
Immunities Clause.69 The class concluded this argument by positing that
even if some fee differential were allowable under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, its per capita formula was better suited to Privileges
and Immunities analysis than the State's pro rata formula.7
Finally,*the class argued that it was "entitled to a refund with statutory
prejudgment interest of all unlawfully exacted license and permit fees from
the date the class action was filed."'"
The State responded to the class by raising two arguments on appeal. 2
First, the State argued that its fee differentials did not violate the Privileges
and Immunities Clause.73 The State supported this assertion by arguing that
its pro rata formula was the appropriate choice for a Privileges and
Immunities case.74 The State then showed that under thepro rata formula,
the fee differentials did not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 5
67. Id. at 28-32.
68. l& at 33-38.
69. Id. at 33. This relationship stretches back to the Articles of Confederation. The
Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Commerce Clause both appeared in Article IV.
SAMUEL A. PLEAsANTs m, THE ARTicLKs OF CONFEDERATION 45 (1968).
70. Reply Brief of Appellants at 19-28, Carlson v. State, 919 P.2d 1337 (Alaska 1996)
(No. S-6590). It appears that the class made this argument as something of an afterthought.
The class stated: "Comparing methodologies is an irrelevant and futile exercise if the
underlying attribution rationale violates the Commerce and Privileges and Immunities
Clauses." Id. at 19.
71. Brief of Appellants at 38-47, Carlson v. State, 919 P.2d 1337 (Alaska 1996) (No.
S-6590).
72. BriefofAppellee at 1, Carlson v. State, 919 P.2d 1337 (Alaska 1996) (No. S-6590).
In a footnote, the State formally recognized the class's third argument about its entitlement
to a refund. The State, however, concluded that this argument presented no issue on appeal.
Id.
73. IdL at 11-33.
74. IL at 11-21. The general theme of this argument ran that because the theoretical
basis allowing higher fees for nonresidents was the recovery of costs related to benefits
provided, a per capita approach made no sense. Id.
75. Id For example, the State's figures show that in 1989 while resident commercial
1999]
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In advancing this argument, the State noted that the class's per capita
formula had never been followed by any court or commentator.76
Second, the State argued that its fee differentials could not violate the
Commerce Clause because the fee differentials in question were not subject
to scrutiny under the Clause." The State explained this position by stating
that in Commerce Clause cases, "[t]he Supreme Court focuses on the
particular activity that triggers the state tax or fee[,J" and that in this case
"the activity that triggers Alaska's fees is participating in the state's
commercial fisheries, not entering the state.,
78
C. The Carlson H Decision
The case invited the Supreme Court of Alaska to decide the constitu-
tional issues de novo and to evaluate the superior court's adoption of the
State's pro rata formula.79 Writing for a majority, Justice Compton began
the opinion by rejecting the class's argument that the case should be
decided under the Commerce Clause." The court reasoned that unlike
Oregon Waste Systems, the fee differentials in this case were not "predi-
cated upon the movement of articles of commerce across state lines, but
rather upon the residency status of those applying for permits."'" The
Supreme Court of Alaska noted that the U.S. Supreme Court analyzes
statutes based on residency under the Privileges and Immunities or Equal
Protection Clauses of the U.S. Constitution."
The Supreme Court of Alaska next analyzed the class's Privileges and
Immunities action. The court recognized that the Carlson I court had
settled certain preliminary threshold issues and moved straight to an
analysis of whether the fee differentials could pass the second step of the
Toomer test.8 The court began this analysis by rejecting the class's
fishermen paid ninety percent of their pro rata share of the state's fisheries budget,
nonresident commercial fishermen paid only forty-one percent. Therefore, under the State's
formula, the fee differentials were constitutional that year. Id. at 20.
76. Id. at 24-28.
77. Id. at 33-37.
78. Brief for Appellee at 34-35, Carlson v. State, 919 P.2d 1337 (Alaska 1996) (No.
S-6590).
79. Carlson v. State, 919 P.2d 1337, 1339 (Alaska 1996).
80. Id. at 1340-41.
81. Id. at 1340.
82. Id. at 1340-41.
83. Id. at 1341-42.
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argument that the U.S. Supreme Court's Oregon Waste Systems decision
prohibited the State from arguing that its fee differentials were nondiscrimi-
natory." The Supreme Court of Alaska explained this rejection by stating
that it would not be "analytically sensible" to use the reasoning of a
Commerce Clause case in resolving this Privileges and Immunities issue.
85
The court further reasoned that contrary to the class's contentions, the kind
of fee differential denounced in Oregon Waste Systems was not the same
as the one the Carlson I court had outlined in the issue it remanded to the
superior court.86
The Supreme Court of Alaska continued its Privileges and Immunities
analysis with an evaluation of the competing formulae advanced by the
class and the State on appeal. 7 The court stated that the correct formula
should "compare the relative burden placed on resident and nonresident
commercial fishers. ' 88 The court concluded that the class's per capita
formula "does just this." 9 The court, however, remanded the case back to
the superior court because issues concerning the budgetary items to be
included in the formula remained unresolved from when the case was last
at the superior court.' The Supreme Court of Alaska held that the superior
court should determine the appropriate budget and apply it to the class's
formula.9' The Supreme Court of Alaska stated that if on doing this the
state's nonresident commercial fishery fee differentials exceeded the
84. Id. At 1342.
85. Carlson v. State, 919 P.2d 1337, 1342 (Alaska 1996). The Supreme Court of
Alaska stated:
In this case the Privileges and Immunities Clause question turns on whether there is
a sufficient relationship between the higher fees charged nonresidents and the State's
interest in imposing on nonresidents their share of the costs for managing the State's
commercial fisheries. In Oregon Waste Systems, the issue was whether the interstate
and intrastate taxes [were] imposed on sufficiently equivalent events such that they
could be considered proxies for each other... These are different inquiries for which
the analysis is not interchangeable.
Id. (citations omitted).
86. Id The Supreme Court of Alaska noted that in Carlson I it had advocated a fee
differential that would merely balance out any expenditures from taxes which only residents
paid. By comparison, if applied to this case, the fee denounced in Oregon Waste Systems
would impose on nonresidents their entire share of the costs of commercial fisheries
management, while the residents' share would be borne by the entire population of Alaska.
Id.
87. Id at 1342-44.
88. Id. at 1343.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1344.
91. Carlson v. State, 919 P.2d 1337, 1344 (Alaska 1996).
1999]
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residents' per capita contribution, then the fee differentials must be
stricken as violative of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.92 Finally, on
the question of a refund, the Supreme Court of Alaska held that if the
superior court found for the class, "it must determine the date from which
the class should be given a refund, and what, if any, interest is due on that
refund."93
In a dissent to the Carlson H opinion, Justice Rabinowitz argued that
the court erred in rejecting the U.S. Supreme Court's analysis in Oregon
Waste Systems as inapposite in a Privileges and Immunities case.94
IV. DISCUSSION
In Baldwin v. Fish and Game Commission of Montana,95 Justice
Blackmun noted that the Privileges and Immunities Clause "is not one of
the contours [of the Constitution] which have been precisely shaped by the
process and wear of constant litigation and judicial interpretation .... 9'
This statement is suggestive of the uncertainty that surrounds the Privileges
and Immunities Clause. The strength of the Carlson 11 opinion is that, at
least in the field of commercial fisheries law, it goes a long way in ironing
out the contours of uncertainty to which Justice Blackmun alluded. The
opinion does this by endorsing an objective formula to test whether the
state has met its burden of proof in the second step of the Toomer test.
A. The per Capita Formula
This Note contends that in selecting the class's per capita formula, the
Supreme Court of Alaska made the correct choice. The Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the U.S. Constitution was designed to protect
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1346-49. The dissent argued that Oregon Waste Systems did not turn on the
size of the fee differential, but rather on its very existence. Id. at 1347. If anything, the
dissent's argument is strengthened by the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564 (1997) which applied
a virtually per se rule of invalidity to a state law that it found facially discriminatory against
interstate commerce.
95. 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
96. Id. at 379.
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individual citizens.97 This focus on the individual is the basic reasoning
behind the class's use of a per capita formula.98 The per capita formula
assumes that all Alaskan residents, not just resident commercial fishermen,
contribute to the state's fisheries budget. 9 The formula determines the
differential that should be charged to establish substantial equality between
resident and nonresident commercial fishermen. " Thus, by concentrating
on the individual, the class's per capita formula ensures substantial
equality for all.
By contrast, the State's focus on residents and nonresidents as groups
ultimately results in inequality. The State's argument is based on the fact
that, as a group, resident commercial fishermen contribute a higher
percentage of their pro rata share of Alaska's fisheries budget than
nonresident commercial fishermen.'' From this position, the State
reasoned that it has the right to recover the same pro rata share from
nonresident commercial fishermen."' The inequity of this position can be
demonstrated by the fact that under the State' s own formula and figures, the
maximum nonresident fee differential that could have been charged to
nonresidents in one year was $5452."03 This differential is more than ten
97. See, e.g., Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948) (stating that the Privileges
and Immunities Clause "was designed to insure to a citizen of State A who ventures into
State B the same privileges which the citizens of State B enjoy").
98. Reply Brief of Appellants at 20, Carlson v. State, 919 P.2d 1337 (Alaska 1959)
(No. S-6590).
99. Brief of Appellants at 5, Carlson v. State, 919 P.2d 1337 (Alaska 1996) (No.
S-6590).
100. The size of this differential is equal to the per capita contribution of any Alaska
resident to the state's fisheries budget. By paying this amount, nonresidents would
contribute to Alaska's fisheries budget in a substantially equal way. See id. at 7.
101. Brief of Appellee at 20, Carlson v. State, 919 P.2d 1337 (Alaska 1996) (No.
S-6590).
102. Id.
103. Under the State's formula and figures for 1989, the maximum permitted fee
differential can be expressed by the following equation:
34,200,000 (NFB) .90 (PPRS)1989 MFD = X - $5452.00
5646 (NR) 1.0
MF-D = Maximum nonresident fee differential
NFB = Nonresident share of fisheries budget
NR = Number of nonresident permit holders
PPRS = Percentage pro rata share paid by resident commercial fishermen as a group
Reply Brief for Appellants at 23, Carlson v. State, 919 P.2d 1337 (Alaska 1996) (No.
S-6590). The class used the figures from 1989 rhetorically to highlight a fundamental
1999]
170 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 4:157
times greater than the highest differential now levied in Alaska, over one
hundred times greater than the Alaska fee differential held unconstitutional
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Mullaney, and well over twice as large as the
Toomer fee differential whose constitutionality the U.S. Supreme Court did
not even seriously consider.'O°
B. The Future Applicability of the per Capita Formula
When the class's per capita formula is eventually applied on remand,
it will determine in an instant whether Alaska's commercial fishery fee
differentials are violative of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. It is the
instantaneous nature of this formula that has the potential to revolutionize
an area of the law that has thus far been characterized by slow, incremental
change. 5 Important questions, however, remain about the applicability of
the Carlson II formula outside of Alaska."° Those questions center around
the calculation of the percentage of total state revenues to which nonresi-
dents make no contribution. In Alaska, the calculation of this figure is
relatively simple because the state is in the near unique" position of
levying neither a sales tax' nor a state income tax."° In other states the
calculation of this percentage may be unfeasibly time-consuming,
prohibitively expensive, or both. Indeed, in dictum the U.S. Supreme Court
expressed a certain unwillingness to "plunge ...into the morass of
weakness in the State's formula. In reality, however, a fee differential of $5452 would be
prevented by the statutory limitations imposed by Alaska. See supra notes 36 and 37.
104. Id. at 24.
105. Reasons for this slow pace of change include: The early uncertainty over which
party bore the burden of persuasion (see supra note 49 and accompanying text); and the
relative scarcity of Privileges and Immunities Cases. See supra note 96 and accompanying
text.
106. Virtually every state with a significant commercial fishing industry operates some
kind of nonresident commercial fishing fee differential. Brief of Appellee at 3, Carlson v.
State, 919 P.2d 1337 (Alaska 1996) (No. S-6590). See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7 § 914
(1994) (charging nonresidents ten times as much as residents for commercial fishing
licenses).
107. New Hampshire is the only other state to levy neither a state sales nor a state
income tax. See infra notes 108-09.
108. Federation of Tax Administrators, State Sales Tax Rates (visited Jan. 27, 1998)
<http://www.taxadmin.orglftalrate/sales.html>.
109. Federation of Tax Administrators, State Individual Income Tax Rates (visited Jan.
27, 1998) <http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/indinc.html>.
Carlson v. State
weighing comparative tax burdens."" The problem that this statement
raises is that even with some alternative to the class's per capita formula,
a state is still faced with the burden of proving that the level of discrimina-
tion it practices is somehow closely related to a substantial state interest."'
This burden, however, can only be met with the kind of comparative
financial analysis that the Supreme Court spurned. 2
V. CONCLUSION
In its Carlson II opinion, the Supreme Court of Alaska adopted an
objective formula to test the constitutionality of that state's nonresident
commercial fishery fee differentials under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the U.S. Constitution. When this formula is applied on remand,
it will determine to a mathematical certainty whether Alaska's nonresident
commercial fishery fee differentials violate the Privileges and Immunities
Clause. A system of taxation unique to Alaska makes an application of the
formula relatively simple in that state. In other states, however, the systems
of taxation in operation may make the formula impossible to apply.
Ultimately, it seems that outside of Alaska, the future of the formula and
perhaps the future of all nonresident commercial fishery fee differentials
will depend on the systems of state taxation in operation, the sophistication
of available statistics, and the willingness of courts to plunge into a morass
that the Supreme Court dared not enter.
110. Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality of the State
of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 105 (1994).
111. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948).
112. See supra notes 18-34 and accompanying test. The cases discussed in this section
strongly suggest that a state must present compelling financial evidence of a close
relationship between the discrimination practiced and a substantial state interest.
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